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A B S T R A C T
Theoretical literature on whether school competition raises public school productivity is ambiguous (e.g. MacLeod & Urquiola, 2015) and empirical evidence is mixed
(e.g. Hsieh and Urquiola, 2006). Moreover, competition might itself be an outcome of changes in productivity (e.g. Hoxby, 2003). We provide evidence for the
negative effect of the threat of competition on students’ test scores in elementary public schools in Poland. The identification strategy uses the introduction of the
amendment facilitating the creation of autonomous schools in Poland in 2009 as an external shock to the threat of competition. We focus on the short run in which
there is only a limited set of actions available to schools’ principals. For the total sample we find no effect, however, for more competitive urban educational markets,
we report a drop in test scores in public schools following the increased threat of competition. This negative effect is robust to the existence of autonomous schools
prior to the amendment and to the size of public schools. It does not result from a pre-existing or concurrent trend either. We exclude student sorting and adjustments
in schools’ expenditures as potential channels.
1. Introduction
Disconnection between educational expenditures and student
achievement (Mayer & Peterson, 1999), as well as between standard
measures of school quality and student achievement (Hanushek, 2003)
has turned economists’ attention to the incentive structure of public
schools (Betts, 1995; Hoxby, 2003). There is a substantial disagreement
in the literature on how market-like incentives can impact on public
school performance. For those who argue that following increased
competition public schools should improve their quality (Hoxby, 2003),
the basic argument is that more productive schools would drive stu-
dents away from their current school. This process would continue until
higher-quality schools dominate the whole educational market or
lower-quality schools respond to competitive pressure. This would be
true if public schools reacted to competition by increasing productivity.
McMillan (2005), MacLeod and Urquiola (2013) argue, however, that
schools may find it optimal to exert lower effort if the losses from the
smaller market share are more than offset by the saving in effort cost. In
other words, the theoretical literature does not provide a clear sign for
the productivity changes in public schools due to increased competi-
tion.
Empirical evidence is also not strong, as acknowledged in a recent
edition of the Handbook of the Economics of Education
(Epple, Romano, and Zimmer, 2016, p. 199), and faces methodological
challenges. Most importantly, it suffers from identification problems.
Usually competitors do not locate randomly, whereas ideally an exo-
genous variation in the size of competition is needed. The actual com-
petition is endogenous with respect to market characteristics and ac-
tions of existing competitors (e.g. entry deterrence). Therefore, as
pointed out by Hoxby (2003, p. 32), it is the threat of competition that
matters.
In this paper we extend the empirical literature by providing evi-
dence on the negative effect of the threat of competition from com-
munity schools on public school performance in Poland. Community
schools are more autonomous than public schools with respect to tea-
chers’ hiring, their salaries, and collecting external funds, but they have
to follow a nationwide curriculum. As an identification strategy we use
the amendment to the Education Act introduced in March 2009, which
facilitated the transformation of existing small public schools to com-
munity schools, but only for schools that have 71 and fewer students.
The higher the percentage of students in schools with enrolment below
71, the more large public schools in the area are exposed to the threat of
competition. The Polish reform is thus a source of exogenous variation
in competitive pressure.
Using year 2009 as a breakthrough date in a difference-in-differ-
ences technique, we find that the higher threat of competition caused
by the aforementioned reform has significant negative impact on the
performance of urban public schools.1 A one standard deviation
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increase in the treatment intensity leads to around -.03 standard de-
viation change in the outcome.2 The effect is similar for public schools
that are larger (more than 150 and 300 students) and becomes stronger
for schools that already have a community school in their neighbour-
hood and may thus be more aware of the consequences of the reform.
We show that the effect does not result from a pre-existing or con-
current trend. The aggregate effect could be driven by changes in stu-
dent population, changes in available resources or changes in pro-
ductivity (i.e. residual effect) (Epple et al., 2016; Hsieh & Urquiola,
2006). We exclude student sorting and adjustments in school ex-
penditures as potential channels.
To understand how reform increases competitive pressure, we must
understand how it changes the incentives of local government and large
public schools. These are related to how education is financed. Most of
the schools in Poland are financed by the central government through
subsidies. The subsidy from central government is tied to the pupil (the
money goes with him/her). In theory this should be sufficient to cover
all expenditures on education, excluding investments and pre-school
education. In practice, it covers only around 50–70% of the costs
(Herbst, Herczyński, & Levitas, 2009; Instytut Badań Edukacyjnych,
2011) and the rest is covered by local governments. Because of fixed
costs, smaller schools yield higher cost per student and local govern-
ments have an incentive to close them down and switch pupils to bigger
entities. Such a decision, however, might be not politically feasible.
Parents object to closures because of a higher distance to a new school
and the school’s role in the cultural and social life of a local community.
Community school is an attractive option for the local government,
because with such schools the government does not have to finance
expenditures that exceed the amount of the central subsidy. The school
itself is more flexible than a public school in regulating its costs, be-
cause it is not forced to abide by collective bargaining agreements
concerning teachers’ wages (i.e. roughly 80% of the costs) and can
acquire external funding. Due to lower costs, local politicians are in-
centivized to consider the transformation of all public schools into
community schools.3
These changed incentives on the part of the local government create
a new regime for large public elementary schools. For them, the liqui-
dation of a small school is beneficial, because they can then capture
students from a liquidated school and thus receive more funding. In the
case of a handover they lose these potential funds, but now there is also
a new type of competitor, with more flexibility in cost-rationalization
and financing, which can steal students from them. Principals of large
public schools are thus motivated to influence local politicians to close
endangered schools and block the entry of new schools. It is unlikely
that principals would form a coalition with parents and transform their
school into a community school, because they are more free in their
decisions when they respond to a local politician than directly to par-
ents. Therefore, the ensuing number of liquidations and community
schools is endogenous and subject to the degree of competition. There is
also a potential heterogeneity in schools’ response to the new type of
competition.
Apart from the unique possibility for analyzing exogenous variation
in the threat of competition that Polish reform enables, the Polish case
is interesting for several other reasons. It is a transition country whereas
most evidence comes from highly developed economies (mostly the
United States and Scandinavia). It has experienced substantial gains in
PISA scores, rising from 470 points in 2000 to 518 in 2012, placing
Poland fifth in Europe and eleventh in the world. It significantly
transformed its education system in the last decade.
Polish community schools differ from such schools in other coun-
tries (Heers, Van Klaveren, Groot, Maassen van den Brink et al., 2011).
In Poland, they are not targeted at low or high-income students, as the
main reason for their establishment is cost-rationalization. They op-
erate like regular schools, but they are given substantial autonomy in
management, which makes them similar to charter schools in the USA
or autonomy schools in the UK. The current body of evidence finds
modest effects of the impact of charter schools on the academic per-
formance of public schools (Bettinger, 2005; Booker, Gilpatric,
Gronberg, & Jansen, 2008). Clark (2009) analyses the British reform
and finds no evidence of spillover effects of schools with increased
autonomy on the neighbouring schools. Eyles and Machin (2015) study
the introduction of academy schools in the UK and report positive ef-
fects on other schools. In other study, Cremata and Raymond (2014)
find greater effects when the impact comes from higher-quality charter
schools. This may be related to why we find a greater effect in urban
areas, in which schools are generally better. Consistent with our results,
using a variety of estimation approaches Imberman (2011) argues that
charter schools may have negative a impact on public schools.
Hoxby (2003) also exploits changes in the threat of competition and
finds a positive reduced-form effect on student performance. We find a
negative effect, and, in addition, we show that it was not driven by
sorting of student and financial resources.4
Another strand of literature focuses on large scale voucher reforms
in Chile and Sweden and exploits changes in private enrolment. In 1981
Chile introduced nationwide school choice by providing vouchers to
students, resulting in 20 a percentage point increase in the private
enrolment rate. Hsieh and Urquiola (2003) find that the main effect of
this expansion is school stratification. This is consistent with the pre-
dictions of the reputational model by MacLeod and Urquiola (2009). If
a school’s reputation depends on both productivity and on the ability of
its students, private schools have the incentive to boost their reputation
by cream skimming the best students rather than by raising pro-
ductivity. On the contrary, if schools cannot select on ability (e.g. they
must select students via lotteries), then their model implies that school
choice will unambiguously raise school performance and student out-
comes. It seems that this is what happened in Sweden following the
1991 reform that led to the creation of independent municipality fund
schools (Böhlmark & Lindahl, 2015). In the short run, on which we
concentrate, school behaviour might be different than predicted by
MacLeod and Urquiola (2009), because some options are not available,
for instance, firing unproductive teachers. Often what remains available
to school principals is either efficiency changes, that is, incentivising
teachers to work harder, or boosting their school’s prestige. We find no
evidence for increasing teachers’ salaries or investment in the infra-
structure. Anecdotal evidence suggests that principals may deter the
entry of community schools by shifting their attention from tasks or-
iented at the performance of students, to those which are visible to
parents (e.g. school trips).
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we describe the
education system in Poland with particular emphasis on community
schools and the reform. In Section 3 we present empirical strategy and
data. Sections 4 and 5 contain, respectively, results and robustness
checks. In Section 6 we analyse and discuss possible channels of
transmission. The last section concludes.
2 This magnitude corresponds to the effect of an increase of classroom size by
one student in Israel or Sweden (Angrist & Lavy, 1999; Fredriksson, Öckert, &
Oosterbeek, 2012) or by three students in California (Jepsen & Rivkin, 2009).
3 For example, the mayor of Hanna in eastern Poland gave all public schools
in his municipality to parental associations (Grabek, 2013).
4 There is also related literature on the effects of decentralization in the US
(Hoxby, 2000; Rothstein, 2007). This, however, provides choice between public
school districts rather than between private and public schools, so this literature
answers a different question and so far has produced mixed results. Similarly for
the effects of private voucher-induced competition on public school perfor-
mance in the USA (Abdulkadiroğlu, Angrist, Hull, & Pathak, 2016; Figlio &
Hart, 2014; Hoxby, 2002).
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2. Community schools in Poland
Polish comprehensive education is compulsory and consists of six
years of elementary school (ISCED 1), which is followed by three years
of lower secondary school gimnazjum (ISCED 2). Elementary school and
gimnazjum usually serve the same community of students, but they are
separate entities, with different managerial and teaching bodies. After
finishing the comprehensive part, student may finish their education or
continue in academic, mixed or vocational higher secondary school
(ICED 3). Admission to elementary school and gimnazjum is based on
catchment areas. During comprehensive education, students are ex-
amined by two standardized, externally graded and obligatory ex-
aminations: a low-stake exam after elementary school (6th grade) and a
high-stake exam after gimnazjum (9th grade).5 The school averages from
these exams are published in various unofficial school rankings. The
only official measure of school quality is the school-level educational
value added, but it is only available for gimnazja.
The Polish education system, and the Polish administrative system in
general, is considered to be very decentralized (Herbst et al., 2009). All
public elementary and secondary schools (gimnazja) are governed by local
governments, and the role of central government is limited to educational
financing and imposing a core curriculum. Local governments are free to
open and close new schools, hire teachers, principals and redistribute
money among schools. The subsidy from central government in practice
covers between 50% and 70% percent of the costs in various municipalities
(Herbst et al., 2009; Instytut Badań Edukacyjnych, 2011). They have to
cover the rest, which makes closing and merging schools an attractive al-
ternative. This, however, is often politically costly for local policymakers.
The creation of community schools allows them to avoid such political risks,
and local governments do not need to contribute their own revenues. They
only transfer the subsidy from the central authority.
Community schools have to follow a nation-wide curriculum, but
are more autonomous than public schools. They can manage the
composition of the teaching body more flexibly, which is important
given that teacher wages are almost 80% of the costs of public schools.
In particular, teachers employed in regular public schools sign their
contracts with their corresponding local government, but the lower
band of their wages is set by the central authority (in agreement with
the teachers’ unions).6 Moreover, they have several benefits, for in-
stance, the right to a year-long sick leave, which is exceptional among
occupational groups financed from the central budget. Conversely, the
specifics of their contracts with the community school are negotiated at
a school level and their wage is regulated by the free market. It is also
important that they have better opportunities than public schools in
terms of acquiring external funds (e.g. from the European Union). Fi-
nally, parental involvement in community schools is higher than in
public schools since community schools are often led by parents’ as-
sociations, so the principal - agent problems are less severe.
Before 2009 a school could be taken over by the association only
after it had been liquidated first, that is, a new school had to be set up.
Liquidation was a complicated process and many activists and politi-
cians saw the need for an improvement of this procedure. The first
official project was introduced in June 2008 by the ruling party, Civic
Platform (PO) and it immediately ignited public debate. The opposition
was trying to block the reform and the teachers’ unions organised the
nation-wide campaign against schools’ handover “Do not let our school
get ruined”. After almost a year of ongoing debate, the amendment to
the Education Act 1991 was finally introduced in March 2009. It allows
the takeover of schools without putting them into liquidation when the
school’s enrolment is smaller than 70 pupils.7 This number has no
specific meaning. Fig. 1 shows the distribution of school size in Poland;
Fig. 1. The Distribution of School Size in 2008 Note: The plot presents the distribution of school size in 2008. The upper panel is for all schools, the bottom panel only
for schools smaller than 300 students.
5 The 9th grade exam serves as a basis for admission into higher secondary
education (ISCED 3).
6 In 2015 the minimum monthly gross wages ranged from 1513 PLN (340
EUR) to 3109 (700 EUR). Additionally, local municipalities have to make sure
that the average total gross salary for each teacher’s rank within municipality is
at least as large as specified in Karta Nauczciela. In 2015 these averages ranged
from 2717 PLN (612 EUR) to 5000 PLN (1126 EUR).
7 The old way of a handover through liquidation was left as an option,
though.
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it shows no bunching around the value 71. The mean size is 192 and the
median is 125. The distribution is relatively dispersed, with the stan-
dard deviation of 172. There are still some legal problems with the
handover (e.g. the takeover has to be announced around 11 months in
advance), but the 2009 amendment is considered a very important step
in introducing community schools into the Polish system.
There are currently 11,398 public elementary schools and 949 ele-
mentary schools run by associations. Not all such schools result from
handovers, but this is now the main channel through which community
schools are established. Indeed, the amendment accelerated handovers
significantly. While in 2009 there were 30 handovers, in 2011 the
number was 89 and in 2012–244. In the year 2010, only 19 handovers
took place, but this is due to local elections, which discourage any
changes to the school network (Herczynski & Sobotka, 2013). Alto-
gether, between 2008 and 2012, 446 schools were handed over to non-
public associations, 84.9% of which were elementary schools.
3. Empirical strategy and data
The amendment facilitated the handing over of schools with less
than 71 pupils. The existence of such schools is likely to be correlated
with unobserved characteristics of gminas and therefore simple regres-
sion of outcome on the proportion of small schools will be biased. Yet,
as long as these characteristics do not change over time, we can control
for them by focusing on changes. We exploit the introduction of the
amendment to the Education Act 1991 from March 2009 as a break-
through point in difference-in-differences technique. In other words, we
claim that schools that have low exposure to treatment, that is, an al-
most unchanged threat of competition following the reform, act as a
control group for schools that face a bigger threat. If schools with low
exposure faced bigger threats, then our results would give a lower (in
absolute terms) bound estimate of the true effect. The threat of com-
petition is measured as the fraction of students in a given municipality
who attend a school with 70 or less pupils. The outcome variable is the
result of standardised and obligatory nation-wide external exams taken
by students at the end of elementary school in schools with more than
70 students. We use a set of controls, in particular, we control for the
population size of the municipality, which to some extent determines
the structure of the school network. Our goal is to capture the effect of
the threat of competition, not the threat of being transformed into a
community school.
We follow Card (1992) and use the following panel fixed effect
model:= × + + + +S T After X µ µ( ) ,igt g t gt i t igt (1)
where Sigt is an average test score in a public elementary school i located
in a municipality g at time t. Tg is a fraction of students in a municipality
g who attended elementary public school with less than 71 pupils in the
Table 1
Descriptive statistics (2008).
N Mean SD Min Max Corr(x, T)
Unit of observation: Municipality
Panel A: Total sample
Standardized 6th grade exam 2477 −.12 0.54 −1.92 1.69 ***0. 010
Unemployment rate (in %) 2477 7.6 3.8 1 25 0.262⁎⁎⁎
Expenditures per capita (th.) 2477 2.547 1.067 1.606 4.5560 −0.01⁎⁎⁎
Population(th.) 2477 15 51 1.35 1710 −0.0003⁎⁎⁎
Population age 0–18 (in %) 2477 21 2.48 11 33 0.004⁎⁎⁎
Population density (th. per km2) 2477 0.244 1.28 0.005 59.5 −0.010⁎⁎⁎
Educational expenditures per capita (th.) 2477 0.929 0.183 0.454 2.846 0.04⁎⁎⁎
Kindergarten attendance (in %) 2471 51 18 3 120 −0.167⁎⁎⁎
Sec. school gross enrollment (in %) 2465 97 16 3 206 −0.116⁎⁎⁎
Number of elementary-school students 2477 910 2177 64 66,450 −1e-05⁎⁎⁎
Students in schools <71 (in %) 2477 9.4 12.3 0 78.8 N/A
Community schools (in %) 2477 3.2 9.1 0 80 −0.010
Panel B: Rural only
Standardized 6th grade exam 2229 0.17 0.53 −1.93 1.69 −0.004
Unemployment rate (in %) 2229 7.7 3.8 1 25 0.171⁎⁎
Expenditures per capita (th.) 2229 2.523 1.084 1.606 4.5560 ***0. 01
Population(th.) 2229 8.3 4.76 1.3 23.7 −0.006⁎⁎⁎
Population age 0–18 (in %) 2229 22 2.36 11 33 0.0005
Population density (th. per km2) 2229 0.12 0.24 0.005 3.8 −0.101⁎⁎⁎
Educational expenditures per capita (th.) 2229 0.931 0.179 0.454 2.846 0.04⁎⁎⁎
Kindergarten attendance (in %) 2223 49 17 3 120 ***0. 136
Sec.school gross enrollment (in %) 2217 96 16 3 206 −0.085⁎⁎⁎
Number of elementary-school students 2229 557 319 64 1999 −7e-06⁎⁎⁎
Students in schools <71 (in %) 2229 10 13 0 79 N/A
Community schools (in %) 2229 3 9.2 0 80 0.010
Panel C: Urban only
Standardized 6th grade exam 248 0.27 0.39 0.86 1.35 −0.002
Unemployment rate (in %) 248 6 2.6 1 15 0.092
Expenditures per capita (th.) 248 2.768 0.871 1.786 8.663 0.003
Population(th.) 248 79 145 23.8 1710 −0.00001
Population age 0–18 (in %) 248 19 2.1 12 27 0.002⁎⁎
Population density (th. per km2) 248 1.37 3.8 0.043 59.5 −0.0007
Educational expenditures per capita (th.) 248 0.917 0.222 0.559 1.554 0.0002
Kindergarten attendance (in %) 248 72 10 31 99 ***0. 043
Sec. School gross enrollment (in %) 248 109 11 68 165 ***0. 049
Number of elementary-school students 248 4079 5949 837 66,450 0
Students in schools <71 (in %) 248 1.6 2.5 0 11 N/A
Community schools (in %) 248 4.8 8 0 50 −0.031
Notes: All variables are defined at the municipality level, except the Standardized 6th Grade Exam, which is defined at the school level and we calculate the weighted
average for each municipality. The last columns present correlations with the treatment variable at the municipality level, which is defined as a share of students
attending schools smaller than 71 students. *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10%.
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year 2008. A higher value of this variable means a bigger threat of
competition after the introduction of the 2009 amendment. The time
dummy Aftert switches on for observations after the introduction of the
amendment, that is, years 2009–2012 (“before” means years
2005–2008). μt are year-specific effects, Xgt are time-variant char-
acteristics of gminas, μi are school fixed effects. Finally, ϵgit is the error
term.
The parameter of interest is β. As mentioned in the Introduction,
theoretical literature is not clear about its sign, but the initial pre-
sumption was that it is positive, that is, we expect that a higher threat of
competition induces public schools to improve their outcomes or that it
induces the flow of students between schools that drives the result.
Moreover, reading the current evidence, we expect the effect to be
heterogeneous in sub-samples. In particular, the effect should be
stronger in more developed and dense educational markets. Therefore
we run separate analyses for both urban and rural areas, as there are
substantial differences in Poland between these markets (Jakubowski &
Kozińska-Bałdyga, 2005).
Our sample consists of 9846 publicly funded elementary schools
with enrolment above 70 students (robustness checks restrict the
sample to bigger entities). The data on the outcome variable come from
the Central Examination Commission. The elementary school exam
score is generally irrelevant for further education, however, it is ob-
ligatory and is considered by the local authority in the school evalua-
tion. Students are examined in language and maths skills. The max-
imum score is 40. Information on school enrolment in 2008 comes from
System Informacji Oświatowej (the System of Educational Information).
This registry contains a rich set of characteristics for all schools in
Poland, including spending, infrastructure and changes to the school
network (handovers and closures). The characteristics of municipalities
are taken from the Central Statistical Office of Poland. We could obtain
information on school size for only 70% of observations. For the rest we
approximate the number of students by multiplying the number of
students who took the test by the number of grades (i.e. six).
Imputations do not affect the results.
Table 1 presents the municipality-level descriptive statistics for the
pre-treatment baseline (2008) and their cross correlations with the
treatment variable. We define urban areas as municipalities at and
above the 90th percentile of the distribution of municipality population
size in 2008 (around 23 thousand people), and rural areas below the
90th percentile. In general, rural areas in Poland are significantly
poorer and less developed than urban areas. 4.8% of schools in the
urban areas are led by communities, while in the total and rural sam-
ples the share is around 3%. There is, however, a much higher per-
centage of students going to such schools in rural areas - 10% of all
students (s.d. 12.6pp) - than in urban areas - 1.6% (s.d. 2.5pp). The
treatment variable is positively correlated with the unemployment rate
and educational expenditures, and negatively with total expenditures,
population level and density, kindergarten and secondary school en-
rolment and with number of students. Overall, the higher the fraction of
smaller schools in the area, the worse the municipality’s characteristics.
This is partially explained by the fact that there are more small schools
in less populated areas, which are also poorer.
4. Results
We start by substantiating the claim that the reform increased the
threat of competition. To this end, we estimate (1), but with the number
of handovers as a dependent variable. Table 2 Columns (1) and (2)
show that one standard deviation (σ) increase in the treatment variable
leads to on average 0.02 more episodes of school handover. We now
focus on the main results. Table 3 (column (1)) shows the results of
panel fixed effect estimations, controlling for the year-specific effects
but without the additional covariates. Because the estimator exploits
the variation from within an observation, the unobservable and ob-
servable time - invariant characteristics of schools and gminas cancel
out. The impact of the variable of interest is negative but insignificant.
It becomes larger in absolute terms when one adds educational cov-
ariates (i.e. a municipality’s gross enrolment in pre-school education,
secondary education ratio and expenditures on education per capita)
and covariates describing the general economic condition of a muni-
cipality (i.e. population size, unemployment rate and total expenditures
per capita) (Table 3 column (2)). One σ increase in the fraction of small-
school students causes a drop in the exam score on average by 0.010σ.
The effect is heterogeneous in different areas (Table 3). In rural mu-
nicipalities the effect is smaller than in the full sample and statistically
insignificant. For the urban sub-sample the effect is, in absolute value,
around three times bigger than in the full sample and significant at 1%
level. One σ increase in the treatment variable causes a drop in the
exam score on average by 0.028σ. The change in the value of treatment
from minimum to maximum causes a decrease in the exam score by
0.26σ. Adding covariates does not change the magnitude of the results.
In the total sample, only the coefficients of unemployment rate, popu-
lation density and secondary school enrolment are significant. They are
slightly negative. Population density is highly significant and positive in
the rural sample.8
The results suggest that the introduction of the amendment changes
the performance of urban schools. Why does the effect differ between
urban and rural areas? Compared to the rural market, it is larger and
more competitive with a denser school network and lower costs of
transportation. Population density in urban areas is on average 1370
persons per square kilometre versus 120 in rural areas; the ratio of
elementary schools per square kilometres equals 0.28 in the urban areas
versus 0.06 in the rural areas. Finally, there is only 5% of tertiary
Table 2
The 2009 reform and changes in the school network.
Dependent variable: No. of school handovers No. of school closures
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unit of observation: Municipality-Year
Panel A: Total sample
Treatment effect (Δσ) 0.022⁎⁎⁎ 0.021⁎⁎⁎ 0.028⁎⁎⁎ 0.031⁎⁎⁎
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007)
Observations 9908 9881 9908 9881
Number of municipalities 2477 2475 2477 2475
Mean of dep. variable 0.023 0.022 0.061 0.061
Panel B: Rural only
Treatment effect (Δσ) 0.022⁎⁎⁎ 0.020⁎⁎⁎ 0.030⁎⁎⁎ 0.032⁎⁎⁎
(0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008)
Observations 8916 8889 8916 8889
Number of municipalities 2229 2227 2229 2227
Mean of dep. variable 0.022 0.022 0.061 0.062
Panel C: Urban only
Treatment effect (Δσ) 0.029 0.034 −0.043 −0.045
(0.023) (0.025) (0.060) (0.061)
Observations 992 992 992 992
Number of municipalities 248 248 248 248
Mean of dep. variable 0.026 0.026 0.053 0.053
General characteristics No Yes No Yes
Educational characteristics No Yes No Yes
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Robust and clustered at the municipality level standard errors are re-
ported in parentheses. Table presents the coefficient of interaction between the
treatment variable and the dummy After from regression (1). General covariates
include: unemployment rate, log total municipality expenditure per capita,
population, population density and a share of people aged 0–18. Educational
covariates include: kindergarten attendance, secondary school gross enrolment
ratio and log municipality educational expenditures per capita. The dependent
variables are the number of episodes of school handover (columns (1) and (2))
or school closure (columns (3) and (4)). *** denotes significance at the 1%
level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10%.
8We did not include the results of full regressions in the tables. These results
are available on demand.
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education degree holders in rural areas compared to 12% in urban
areas.
5. Robustness
We carry out the following robustness checks. First, we take into
account that the results might be different for schools that had a
community school in their neighbourhood before the reform. Second,
we check whether the effect differs for larger schools (more than 150
and 300 students) showing that the results are not because of the direct
effect of a higher risk of handover. Third, we check whether we do not
confound the treatment effect with the effect of concurrent trends that
are underway in the municipality. Finally, we analyse the key as-
sumption in the identification strategy, namely, of the same pre-treat-
ment trends in the treated and control municipalities.
Public schools which have a community school in their vicinity
might be more aware of the impact of such schools on their situation,
and thus of the potential consequences of the reform. In addition, as
shown in Tables 1 and 3, in the urban areas there are more community
schools and the negative treatment effect is stronger. Is it possible then
that the negative effect is driven by the pre-reform presence of com-
munity schools? To assess this, we limit our sample to only public
elementary schools located in gminas in which there was at least one
community school in the year 2008. There are now 2731 schools in our
dataset. The effect becomes stronger in all samples (Table 3 columns (3)
and (4)). One standard deviation increase in the treatment intensity
leads to a 0.02–0.03σ drop in the test score. For urban schools, the
magnitude of the results is a bit smaller than in the unrestricted sample,
but still large and significant. As for the second robustness check, given
the heated debate on the amendment before its official introduction and
the fact that the threshold was chosen rather ad hoc, there is a possi-
bility that schools with enrolment just above 71 students were in fact
facing the risk of handover. This might have caused a specific reaction
of these schools to the reform. Since there is a negative correlation in
the sample between a school size and the treatment intensity, our re-
sults could be driven by this effect. Therefore, we now focus only on
public elementary schools that have more than 150 students, which is
close to the median size.9 In the case of schools that have over 150
students the results are virtually the same as in the baseline specifica-
tion. For schools over 300 students, the effect becomes slightly greater
in absolute terms for the urban areas, more than 0.03σ (Table 3 columns
(5) and (6)).
An example of a concurrent trend confounding the treatment effect
is when places with higher exposure to treatment also face worse eco-
nomic conditions, which may also contribute to the negative result. To
assess this, we run a placebo test using the results of the secondary
school exam as a dependent variable. Secondary school handovers are
extremely rare, thus the amendment was unlikely to affect secondary
schools. The exam takes place at the end of the 9th grade, three years
after the elementary school test, and is also obligatory, standardized
and externally graded. This analysis is performed at the municipality
level. The results show the positive and strong effect of the reform,
significant at the 10% level in the total and rural samples (Table 4
columns (1) and (2)). One standard deviation increase in the treatment
intensity leads to around 0.027σ increase in the score. For the urban
schools the effect is greater, almost 0.04σ, but not significant. If any-
thing then, the potential concurrent trends might bias upward our main
results and the reported negative effect might be a conservative esti-
mate.
The key assumption in difference-in-differences technique is that
gminas with different exposure to treatment have the same pre-treat-
ment trends in outcomes. We run an “event study” using a generalized
version of (1), where we allow the treatment effect to vary each year.
Technically, we replace the interaction term between treatment and the
single dummy for all periods after the reform, with individual inter-
actions between treatment and year fixed effects. We estimate the fol-
lowing model:
Table 3
Main results.
Baseline Pre-reform Community school Schools > 150 Schools > 300
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable: Standardized 6th grade exam
Unit of observation: School-Year
Panel A: Total
Treatment effect (Δσ) −0.007 0.010 0.013 0. 028* 0.010 −.011
(0.008) (0.008) (0.014) (0.016) (0.007) (0.007)
Observations 64,964 64,488 17,297 16,928 33,975 16,606
Number of schools 9846 9838 2731 2731 4952 2424
Panel B: Rural only
Treatment effect (Δσ) −0.007 −0.005 0.026 0.023 0.004 0.0004
(0.009) (0.009) (0.022) (0.023) (0.009) (0.012)
Observations 44,705 44,594 5697 5693 17,997 5788
Number of schools 6713 6705 887 887 2590 834
Panel C: Urban only
Treatment effect (Δσ) −0.026⁎⁎⁎ −0.028⁎⁎⁎ **0. 020 −0.022⁎⁎ ***0. 028 −0.031⁎⁎⁎
(0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (.0008)
Observations 20,259 19,894 11,600 11235 15,964 10,818
Number of schools 3133 3133 1844 1844 2360 1590
General characteristics No Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Educational characteristics No Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
School fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Robust and clustered at the municipality level standard errors are reported in parentheses. Table presents the coefficient on the interaction term between the
treatment variable and the dummy After from regression (1). General covariates include: unemployment rate, log total municipality expenditure per capita, po-
pulation, population density and a share of people aged 0–18. Educational covariates include: kindergarten attendance, secondary school gross enrolment ratio and
log municipality educational expenditures per capita. The dependent variable is the average of the standardized 6th grade exam score at the school level. *** denotes
significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10%.
9 In Poland the marginal cost of additional students becomes flat for schools
bigger than 150 students Jakubowski (2006), which implies that closures of
such schools may be less profitable for the local government.
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= × + + + +=S T µ X µ µ( ) .igt t t g t gt i t igt2006
2011
(2)
The notation is similar as above (see Section 3). Note that the year 2005
is a reference point, thus, for instance, β2006 is the effect of the exposure
to the treatment in 2006 relative to 2005. The reform was introduced in
2009, therefore if the common trend assumption is correct, the inter-
actions prior to 2009 should be jointly insignificant. Fig. 2 plots the βt
coefficients against time (x-axis) along with confidence intervals, for
the total and urban samples. There are no clear trends in coefficients for
the pre-treatment years and the F-test cannot reject the null hypothesis
that the interaction terms are jointly insignificant. At the same time
there is a clear brake in the reported interactions for the years after the
reform.
Another way to test the key assumption is by showing that there is
no correlation between the treatment intensity and time trend for the
period before the reform. To this end, we estimate the following model
on the pre-reform sample (2005–2008):= × + + + + +S T Trend Trend X µ µ( ) .igt g t t gt i t igt (3)
Under the parallel trend assumption = 0 and indeed almost all re-
ported coefficients are close to zero and statistically insignificant
(Table 5). In two specifications in the total sample (Table 5 columns (1)
and (3)), we report a small, positive and marginally significant corre-
lation, which actually suggests that we might underestimate the abso-
lute value of the treatment effect when looking at the full sample.
Finally, we run an augmented model, which identifies the treatment
effect without relying on the parallel trend assumption. We follow
Angrist and Pischke (2014), Jaeger, Joyce, and Kaestner (2018) and
include interaction terms between municipality fixed effects and time
trends into our baseline regression. This way we directly control for all
municipality-level trends potentially affecting the outcome. We esti-
mate the following regression= × + + × + + +S T After X µ Trend µ µ( ) ( ) ,igt g t gt
i
i g t i t igt (4)
where μg is municipality fixed effects. Note that we effectively include
almost 2500 additional variables into the regression and thus we might
have a low-power problem. Alternatively, we run a model where, in-
stead of municipality-specific time trends we include covariate-specific
time trends. Thus we can partially control for differential municipality-
level trends, but avoid a low-power problem as we add only 10 new
variables. The model takes the following form= × + + × + + +S T After X X Trend µ µ( ) ( ) .igt g t gt
x
x g t i t igt2008
(5)
Controlling for covariate-specific trends does not affect the magnitude
of the estimates (Table 6 columns (1) and (2)). The only difference,
compared to the main results (Table 3), is that the effect of the threat of
competition becomes significant for the whole sample. When munici-
pality-specific trends are taken into account (Table 6 columns (3) and
(4)) treatment effects are sizebly larger than in the baseline model. For
the whole sample, one standard deviation increase in the treatment
intensity leads to a 0.1σ drop in the test score. The same holds for rural
and urban sub-samples, but the estimates are not precise, possibly due
to a low-power problem. More negative effects (Table 5), might indicate
that the pre-treatment trends bias the results upward in the previous
specifications. To summarize, we test the parallel trend assumption in
three different ways and in each test we find that the estimated negative
effect of the threat of competition is not driven by the differential pre-
treatment trends in outcome.
6. Channels
In the previous sections we provide evidence for the negative effect
of increased competitive threat. As mentioned in the Introduction, it is
typically difficult to disentangle whether this effect is driven by the
flows/self-selection of students between schools (Hsieh &
Urquiola, 2006), or by changes in schools’ productivity. Sorting has a
direct impact through the composition of students and an indirect im-
pact through peer effects. It is rather unlikely that the effect observed in
the year 2009 is driven by self-selection, as this would imply that
parents decide to send their kids to a different school only for the last
year of their elementary education and they decide so based only on the
information that the reform will be introduced nation-wide. However,
such relocations are more likely in the next few years, therefore we
analyse sorting empirically the best we can with the available data.
We should first distinguish between changes in student flows prior
to the reform and following the reform. The former could drive the
result if, for example, small public schools had a disproportionate
number of high-ability students, and as their schools closed before the
reform, they moved to large public schools increasing their school-level
average performance. The reform stopped this flow as it became harder
to close a small school. Consequently, one should observe a negative
effect of the reform on large schools’ performance in affected areas.
That such pre-reform flows drive the result is excluded by tests on
parallel trend assumption in Section 5. Furthermore, such a scenario is
also inconsistent with Fig. 3, which shows that small schools had dis-
proportionately more low-ability students.
We now focus on student flows after the reform. While the reform
was aimed at saving small schools, because of the strategic behaviour
of large school principals, the reform could have in fact led to more
closures. If students from small schools are on average under-perfor-
mers, then their relocation to larger schools might explain the re-
ported negative effect. However, for urban schools on which we report
Table 4
Results at the municipality level.
Placebo: 9th grade exam Sorting: 6th grade exam
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unit of observation: Municipality-year
Panel A: Total sample
Treatment effect (Δσ) 0.025* 0.026* 0.008 0.009
(0.014) (0.014) (0.012) (0.012)
Observations 17,294 17,272 17,337 17,301
Number of municipalities 2472 2472 2477 2475
Panel B: Rural only
Treatment effect (Δσ) 0.027* 0.029* 0.005 0.002
(0.015) (0.015) (0.013) (0.013)
Observations 15,558 15,538 15,601 15,567
Number of municipalities 2224 2224 2229 2227
Panel C: Urban only
Treatment effect (Δσ) 0.040 0.034 ***0. 059 ***0. 061
(0.025) (0.025) (0.017) (0.017)
Observations 1736 1734 1736 1734
Number of municipalities 248 248 248 248
General characteristics No Yes No Yes
Educational
characteristics
No Yes No Yes
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Robust and clustered at the municipality level standard errors are re-
ported in parentheses. Table presents the coefficient on the interaction term
between the treatment variable and the dummy After from regression (1).
General covariates include: unemployment rate, log total municipality ex-
penditure per capita, population, population density and share of people aged
0–18. Educational covariates include: kindergarten attendance, secondary
school gross enrolment ratio and log municipality educational expenditures per
capita. Columns (1)–(2), the dependent variable is the average of the standar-
dized 9th grade exam score at the municipality level. Columns (3)–(4), the
dependent variable is the average of the standardized 6th grade exam score at
the municipality level. *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5%
level and * at the 10%.
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the negative impact of the threat of competition, the effect of the re-
form on the number of school closures is negative and insignificant
(Table 2 columns (3) and (4)), which is inconsistent. Changes around
the extensive margin thus appear unlikely. Obviously, the negative
effect could also be explained by high-ability students switching from
large public schools to the community schools, or low-ability students
going in the opposite direction, relative to before the reform. We do
not have individual level data to test this, so we follow the approach of
Hsieh and Urquiola (2006). That is, we measure aggregate change in
outcomes at the municipality level. If the documented effect is due to
the flow of students within a municipality, there should be no effect on
the municipality average score as a dependent variable. Note that,
while this approach controls for student composition, it cannot net out
peer effects. The results are very similar to the baseline school-level
regressions (Table 4 columns (3) and (4)), except that there is now an
even more negative effect of the threat of competition in urban areas.
One standard deviation increase in the treatment intensity causes a
0.06σ drop in the average municipality exam score. All in all, we
exclude student sorting as a channel of transmission of our main re-
sult.
We now further unpack school’s productivity, that is, changes in
school’s resources, organization and management in reaction to bigger
competition threat. The data (available from the schools’ registry
System Informacji Oświatowej) allow us to test whether the reform is
related to changes in the share of spending devoted to renovations and
teacher salaries, and on the size of green and sport areas per student.
We estimate (1) with these indicators as dependent variables. We find
no evidence for the impact of higher threat on these variables (Table 7).
Either this channel is not important or principals re-direct resources
towards other activities which we are unable to check. There is some
anecdotal evidence that principals invest in activities that advertise
their school to parents whose children attend a small school. They thus
deter the entry of a community school. For example, in Kożuchowo
(Kloc, 2012) there were plans for a local small school to be handed
over. The principal of the large public school (which would take over
students in the case of liquidation) was trying to persuade parents that
Fig. 2. Event Studies Note: The plot presents the estimates and the 95% confidence intervals of the interaction term between the treatment variable and the year fixed
effects. The coefficient were obtained from a regression of the school-level 6th grade standardised exam scores on the set of interactions and the time fixed effects.
The confidence intervals calculated using clustered and robust standard errors.
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his school was better than the newly established community school:
“[...] for the parents of students [from the small school] he organised
attractive and competitive curriculum. Additional sport and language
classes, after-class activities, school trips, cafeteria, bus transportation
of students, safety were the main points. This offer was passed over to
all parents.” (Kloc, 2012, p. 19).
7. Conclusions
Using the Polish education reform of 2009, we provide evidence
that competitive effects caused by the threat of establishing more
autonomous schools are negative, significant, robust and appear
mainly in urban areas. One standard deviation increase in the
treatment intensity leads to around -.03 standard deviation change in
student performance. This magnitude is not small, it corresponds to
the effect of an increase of classroom size by one student in Israel or
Sweden (Angrist & Lavy, 1999; Fredriksson et al., 2012) or by three
students in California (Jepsen & Rivkin, 2009). The reduced-form
results contrast with the current body of evidence, which tend to find
either positive or null effects of school competition (Epple et al.,
2016), with a notable exception of a negative effect reported by
Imberman (2011). One reason why our study is unique is that, we
capture an exogenous change in the threat of competition. This way,
we can account for the fact that actual entries into educational
markets may be endogenous to school conduct or reactions of ex-
isting schools. In particular, principals might have an incentive to
block the entry of a new school. The entry deterrence might affect the
performance of students, however, in a different way than actual
competition. Our paper is similar to Hoxby (2003), which also ex-
ploits changes in the threat of competition, but also finds a positive
reduced-form effect on student performance.
We focus on the short run in which there is only a limited set of
actions available to schools’ principals. The negative effect can be
driven by the outflow of good students, adjustment in available re-
sources or negative change in productivity (i.e. residual effects). We
exclude student sorting and adjustments in schools’ expenditures as
potential channels, and conclude that the threat of competition
might have a negative effect on school productivity. More research is
needed to fully understand the mechanisms at play. The anecdotal
evidence suggests that when the decisions are made in the short run,
school principals may use simple marketing actions to attract par-
ents, such as school trips. These activities might shift the attention of
teachers and students away from learning. Therefore, the promotion
of performance-based school rankings or an accountability system
might alleviate the short-run negative impact of the threat of com-
petition.
Apart from the unique possibility to analyse exogenous variation in
the threat of competition that the Polish reform enables, the Polish case
is interesting for other reasons. The Economist (2013) wrote “Poland
has made some dramatic gains in education in the past decade. Before
2000 half of the country’s rural adults had finished only primary school.
Yet international rankings now put the country’s students well ahead of
Americas in science and maths (the strongest predictor of future earn-
ings), even as the country spends far less per pupil. What is Poland
doing right? And what is America doing wrong?”. In other words, by
studying the determinants of student performance in countries like
Poland, we can also learn how to improve education systems in highly
developed economies.
Table 5
Treatment effect and pre-reform trend (2005–2008).
Dependent variable: standardized 6th grade exam
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unit of observation: School-year
Panel A: Total sample, 2005–2008
Treatment x trend (Δσ) 0.008* 0.005 0.007* 0.004
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Observations 37,403 37,037 37,370 37,005
Number of schools 9757 9757 9749 9749
Panel B: Rural only, 2005–2008
Treatment x trend (Δσ) 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.003
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Observations 25,778 25,777 25,745 25,745
Number of schools 6667 6667 6659 6659
Panel C: Urban only, 2005–2008
Treatment x trend (Δσ) 0.002 0.003 0.002 −0.004
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006)
Observations 11,625 11,260 11,625 11,260
Number of schools 3090 3090 3090 3090
General characteristics No Yes No Yes
Educational
characteristics
No No Yes Yes
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
School fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Robust and clustered at the municipality level standard errors are re-
ported in parentheses. Table presents the coefficient on the interaction term
between the treatment variable and the time trend, estimated for the years
before 2009. General covariates include: unemployment rate, log total muni-
cipality expenditure per capita, population, population density and a share of
people aged 0–18. Educational covariates include: kindergarten attendance,
secondary school gross enrolment ratio and log municipality educational ex-
penditures per capita. The dependent variable is the average of the standar-
dized 6th grade exam score at the school level. *** denotes significance at the
1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10%.
Table 6
Municipality-specific time trends.
Dependent variable: standardized 6th grade exam
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unit of observation: School-year
Panel A: Total sample
Treatment effect (Δσ) −0.017⁎⁎ −0.015* ***0. 104 −0.103⁎⁎⁎
(0.008) (0.008) (0.034) (0.034)
Observations 64,488 64,488 64,488 64,488
Number of schools 9838 9838 9838 9838
Panel B: Rural only
Treatment effect (Δσ) 0.005 0.005 0.059 0.058
(0.009) (0.009) (0.039) (0.039)
Observations 44,594 44,594 44,594 44,594
Number of schools 6705 6705 6705 6705
Panel C: Urban only
Treatment effect (Δσ) ***0. 03 −0.029⁎⁎⁎ 0.067 −0.066
(0.010) (0.010) (0.044) (0.044)
Observations 19,894 19,894 19,894 19,894
Number of schools 3133 3133 3133 3133
General characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Educational
characteristics
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed effects No Yes No Yes
School fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Covariates (in 2008) x
trend
Yes Yes No No
Municipality FE x trend No No Yes Yes
Notes: Robust and clustered at the municipality level standard errors are re-
ported in parentheses. Table presents the coefficient on the interaction term
between the treatment variable and the dummy After from regression (1).
General covariates include: unemployment rate, log total municipality ex-
penditure per capita, population, population density and a share of people aged
0–18. Educational covariates include: kindergarten attendance, secondary
school gross enrolment ratio and log municipality educational expenditures per
capita. In addition, each regression includes either the interaction term between
covariates (in 2008) and time trend or municipality-specific time trends. The
dependent variable is the average of the standardized 6th grade exam score at
the school level. *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and
* at the 10%.
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Fig. 3. The Average School Performance Note: The plot presents the average standardized (z-score) exam score for schools larger than 71 students, smaller than 71
students, in a breakdown by urban and rural areas.
Table 7
School spending.
Dep. variable: Share of renovation costs (in%) Share of teacher salaries (in%) Greenareas per student (in m2) Sport areas per student (in m2)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Unit of observation: School-year
Panel A: Total sample
Treatment effect (Δσ) 1.132 1.367 0.148 0.069 0.205 0.215 0.0003 -0.011
(2.586) (2.512) (0.001) (0.001) (0.259) (0.274) (0.128) (0.134)
Observations 45,639 45,371 45,454 45,187 45,596 45,331 45,596 45,331
Number of schools 9191 9183 9193 9185 9197 9189 9197 9189
Mean of dep. variable 75.84 75.886 64.8 64.8 22.945 22.991 13.484 13.504
Panel B: Rural only
Treatment effect (Δσ) 2.362 2.558 0.011 −.042 .161 .165 −.121 −.114
(2.975) (3.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.300) (0.308) (0.147) (0.150)
Observations 31,498 31,405 31,379 31,286 31,493 31,402 31,493 31,402
Number of schools 6311 6303 6313 6305 6319 6311 6319 6311
Mean of dep. variable 77.196 77.344 64.7 64.7 26.867 26.873 15.86 15.86
Panel C: Urban only
Treatment effect (Δσ) 0.458 0.227 0.134 0.061 0.157 0.180 −0.344 −0.305
(2.612) (2.625) (0.002) (0.002) (0.198) (0.184) (0.362) (0.346)
Observations 14141 13,966 14,075 13,901 14,103 13,929 14,103 13,929
Number of schools 2880 2880 2880 2880 2878 2878 2878 2878
Mean of dep. variable 72.818 72.607 65.2 65.2 14.188 14.238 8.18 8.191
General characteristics No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Educational characteristics No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
School fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Robust and clustered at the municipality level standard errors are reported in parentheses. Table presents the coefficient on the interaction term between the
treatment variable and the dummy After from regression (1). General covariates include: unemployment rate, log total municipality expenditure per capita, po-
pulation, population density and share of people aged 0–18. Educational covariates include: kindergarten attendance, secondary school gross enrolment ratio and log
municipality educational expenditures per capita. *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10%.
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